Madam Speaker, as chair of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, I want to provide this evening an overview of the committee's composition, mandate and functions, given there have been numerous recent references to NSICOP in the House. I speak this evening exclusively as the chair of our non-partisan committee.
To begin, I wish to offer my sincere thanks on behalf of our committee to our out-going members, the member for Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, the member for Pickering—Uxbridge and the member for Provencher, all valuable members of our committee who offered their considered wisdom, enlivened our debates and provided an important contribution to our work.
I would also like to welcome our new committee members. We look forward to working with the member for Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, the member for Kootenay—Columbia, the member for London-Centre-North, the member for Mississauga—Erin Mills and the member for Montarville.
The committee was established in June 2017 with the passage of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act. In November of that year, the first committee members were appointed. After the 2019 federal election, the committee was reconstituted in February 2020, and yesterday its membership was again updated.
The committee was set up to fill a gap in Canada's national security review framework: first, to give parliamentarians the necessary clearances to conduct reviews of the security and intelligence community drawn from highly classified information; and second, to create a body that could look across the community at a range of issues without being constrained by the mandate of individual organizations or the narrow focus of their review bodies.
The act that established NSICOP is specific and very clear. It lays out, with precision, the committee's membership, the appointment process, members' security obligations, the rights and limits to access information for the committee's work, procedural rules and reporting obligations.
The act also provides that the appropriate committees of the House and the other place must comprehensively review its provisions and its operation five years after its coming into force, which will be in 2022.
Our committee is unprecedented in Canadian parliamentary history. It is unique in terms of our security clearances, the physical requirements of our secure workspaces and our structure. The nature of the committee is multi-party, bicameral, and a membership with a broad range of experience brings a unique perspective to these important issues. We act as a proxy group for Parliament and for Canadians in examining issues related to national security and intelligence.
The committee consists of a chair and up to 10 other members, all of whom are members of one of the two Houses of Parliament. Up to three members may come from the other place and up to eight members may come from the House. No more than five of them can be members of the government, which means that government members never form a majority. With yesterday's announcement, we now have our full complement in place with eight House members and three senators.
Members all hold a top-secret security clearance, have sworn an oath and are permanently bound to secrecy under the Security of Information Act. In the course of its work, the committee may review highly classified information with only a few narrow exceptions. The committee is not entitled to have access to cabinet confidences, to information protected by the Witness Protection Program Act, to information relating to the identity of confidential sources and to information relating directly to an ongoing law enforcement investigation.
We cannot claim parliamentary privilege in the case of unauthorized disclosure of classified information. That is a point I want to emphasize. Members of the committee, myself included, are necessarily circumspect in what we can say in Parliament and in public. It also means that NSICOP members are subject to prosecution under the Security of Information Act should they disclose information they learned in the course of their duties on the committee.
The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians is mandated to review the legislative, regulatory, policy, financial and administrative frameworks for national security and intelligence. It may also review any activity carried out by a department that relates to national security or intelligence.
Finally, the committee may review any matter relating to national security or intelligence that a minister refers to the committee.
NSICOP reports are unanimous and non-partisan. The committee prepares and finalizes its reports through consensus, following painstaking deliberations, and all members agree on final content, assessments and recommendations. NSICOP's reports are informed by the documents that departments and agencies undertaking national security and intelligence activities must provide as well as by the committee's meetings with relevant officials, outside experts and members of civil society.
The workload is heavy. Normally, the committee meets for eight hours a week and sits extra hours when it needs to examine classified documents in a designated secure workspace. Committee members often meet during the weeks when the House is not sitting, as well as during the summer.
NSICOP provides an annual report to the Prime Minister that includes its substantive reviews as well as the committee's recommendations. The Prime Minister may then direct that the committee prepare a revised version of its report. The information to be revised is set out clearly in the act. It is information the disclosure of which would be injurious to national security, to national defence or to international relations, or is information that is protected by litigation privilege, or by solicitor-client privilege or the professional secrecy of advocates and notaries.
There are no other reasons under which a prime minister may direct the committee to remove information from its reports. Information cannot be redacted because it may be embarrassing to or critical of any government.
The redaction process is similar to the one used by the government when determining what information can be released in court proceedings, typically under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act. The Prime Minister tables the revised report in Parliament, and the report is referred to parliamentary committees in both Houses, as required by our statute.
The committee may also submit a special report to the Prime Minister on any matter related to its mandate. Unless the committee has notified the Prime Minister of its intention to prepare a summary of the special report, it also is revised if necessary and tabled and referred in the same manner as the annual reports.
This is very similar to the process followed by—
Madam Speaker, I rise on a point of order. I appreciate the member's service on that committee, but we are here to debate a specific motion. He has yet to address this. He is giving us background of his committee, of which I am sure he is proud. Perhaps, Madam Speaker, you could get him to come to the motion.
The Assistant Deputy Speaker (Mrs. Carol Hughes):
I appreciate the hon. member's point of order. I want to remind members that when they are debating or presenting in the House, they have to be addressing the subject matter at hand, or mentioning the subject matter at hand or portions of it. I know there is some latitude in the speeches, but I want to remind the hon. member and all members that when they are making their speeches, to please ensure they keep in mind the subject matter they are actually debating.
The hon. member for Ottawa South.
Madam Speaker, I was saying that this is very similar to the process followed by the United Kingdom's intelligence and security committee, which must submit its annual and special reports to the prime minister for consultation and review prior to tabling, identifying at that time any redactions that have been made on national security grounds.
Since 2017, we have completed seven studies and produced three annual reports and two special reports. Every member of Parliament and every senator recently received paper copies of our 2020 annual report. This report and the others are also available on our website.
The very important thing for the House to note is that in each instance, NSICOP members reviewed and assessed information up to the government's highest classification. The committee did so with the utmost discretion, arriving at its findings and recommendations independently. Those were then provided to the Prime Minister and responsible ministers.
In our 2018 inaugural annual report, we provided a functional overview of the security and intelligence community, including the most significant national security threats as described by key members of the security and intelligence community. These were terrorism, espionage and foreign interference, cyber-threats, major organized crime and weapons of mass destruction.
Also in 2018, the committee reviewed the government's process for setting intelligence priorities as well as the intelligence activities of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces.
We recognized that defence intelligence activities are essential to the safety and security of our armed forces and the success of Canadian military missions, including overseas operations. The committee recommended, among other things, that the government seriously consider providing explicit legislative authority to the conduct of defence intelligence activities.
The committee also presented its first special report in 2018 regarding the allegations associated with the Prime Minister's official visit to India. One recommendation repeated in the subsequent review of the government response to foreign interference was that members of Parliament and senators be briefed upon being sworn in, and regularly thereafter, on the risks of foreign interference and extremism in Canada.
In 2019, the committee conducted a review of diversity and inclusion in the security and intelligence community. The review provided a baseline assessment of the diversity and inclusion of certain designated groups in the security and intelligence community. On the whole, it was revealed that there was not as much representation there as in the rest of the Canadian public service and that the rates of harassment and discrimination remained unacceptable. We recommended that the situation be reexamined in three to five years in order to assess progress. We also recommended improving data collection and analysis and developing a common performance measurement framework.
NSICOP also reviewed the government's response to the serious challenge of foreign interference. We found that the government's response to the threat was done on a case-by-case, even ad hoc, basis and that our engagement with other levels of government and the Canadian public was limited. In its review, the committee called for a whole-of-government strategy to counter foreign interference and build institutional and public resilience. We were specific in our recommendation about what such a strategy should include and we further recommended that the government support the strategy through sustained central leadership and coordination.
Finally, the committee reviewed the national security and intelligence activities of the Canada Border Services Agency. On the whole, we noticed that the powers that the CBSA has for conducting national security and intelligence activities are clear, well regulated and supported by several acts. However, the CBSA did not receive any instructions from the minister for conducting critical activities related to national security and intelligence. This situation was inconsistent with the practices of CSIS and the RCMP and, in the committee's view, represented a failure of ministerial accountability.
The committee recommended that the Minister of Public Safety provide CBSA directions in writing with regard to sensitive national security and intelligence activities.
That same year, the committee also prepared a special report on the collection, use, retention and dissemination of information on Canadians in the context of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces defence intelligence—
The Assistant Deputy Speaker (Mrs. Carol Hughes):
The hon. member for Central Okanagan—Similkameen—Nicola is rising on another point of order.
Madam Speaker, I rise on a point of order. Five minutes ago I raised a point of order with you, and you asked the member to be relevant. He is basically reviewing the annual reports of his committee, which is not the subject of tonight's debate.
He is not a rookie. He certainly has a committee role that is important, but I would ask you to rule whether he is being relevant to the issue or simply disregarding your ruling and this House.
Madam Speaker, on that same point of order, the entire premise of the government's position hinges on the committee the member represents. The entire argument from the government has to do specifically with this committee, so the member explaining why this committee is the important committee for this is extremely relevant to the argument that the government made.
I would encourage the Speaker to allow him to continue his speech.
The Assistant Deputy Speaker (Mrs. Carol Hughes):
Once again, I appreciate the points of order. I would like to remind members that the question of privilege hinges on the motion and, therefore, there is some latitude.
However, the hon. member for Central Okanagan—Similkameen—Nicola is correct that the hon. member for Ottawa South must ensure that his speech revolves around the question of privilege. That discussion needs to be there. I would suggest the hon. member ensure that his speech is relevant and that he references the motion on the question of privilege.
The hon. member for Ottawa South.
Madam Speaker, I will not be long and the relevance will become quite evident.
Following our examination of the documents provided to the committee and our meetings with DND CAF officials, the committee formed an opinion that DND intelligence activities conducted as part of overseas operations may not be in compliance with the Privacy Act. The committee referred this matter to the Attorney General pursuant to its obligation under section 31.1 of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, which requires it to make such referral when, in its opinion, an activity may not be in compliance with the law.
The review built on the committee's 2018 recommendation that the government give serious consideration to providing explicit legislative authority to the conduct of defence intelligence activities and went further in recommending that the Minister of National Defence introduce legislation governing defence intelligence activities.
In 2020, members of the committee, like all Canadians, were faced with the unprecedented situation of the pandemic. As such, the committee decided to provide the Prime Minister the only consolidated overview of threats to Canada's national security.
The committee found that the threats posed by organized crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction did not fundamentally—
The Assistant Deputy Speaker (Mrs. Carol Hughes):
There is a point of order from the hon. member for York—Simcoe.
Madam Speaker, I was wondering if the hon. member could table the report that he is reading, or go on to the report about the Lake Simcoe clean-up fund, which we are waiting for in York—Simcoe. We would love to hear that.
The Assistant Deputy Speaker (Mrs. Carol Hughes):
That is not really a point of order. I would say it is debate.
I again want to remind the hon. member for Ottawa South that he should ensure his speech is relevant. I will read the motion on the question of privilege, which states:
That this House find the Public Health Agency of Canada to be in contempt for its failure to obey the Order of the House, adopted on June 2, 2021, as well as the orders of the Special Committee on Canada-China Relations, adopted on March 31 and May 10, 2021, and, accordingly, orders its President to attend at the Bar of the House....
Does the hon. member for Ottawa South want me to continue, or does he have the motion before him? Will make sure that his speech is relevant to it?
I have the motion, and as I was saying earlier—
The Assistant Deputy Speaker (Mrs. Carol Hughes):
Perfect. I would suggest he references it every once in a while during his speech.
The hon. member for Ottawa South has the floor.
Thank you, Madam Speaker, for your indulgence.
The committee, of course, has been reviewing the major threats for the country, such as terrorism, espionage, foreign interference and cyber actors, for example. We have reported very openly now for Canadians on the question of terrorism, the growth of ideologically motivated violent extremists, the rise of groups embracing xenophobic violence, anti-authority violence and gender-driven violence. We have seen a growing number of examples of neo-Nazis, white supremacists, misogynist groups and individuals planning or conducting attacks, a trend which is mirrored around the world.
Finally, while the restrictions imposed as part of the COVID lockdowns, such as limitations on travel, have disrupted terrorism facilitation efforts, the pandemic and the concurrent protests increased anti-government rhetoric connected to ideologically motivated violent extremism.
In conclusion, the point of this evening's speech is to illustrate there is a highly functioning committee composed of good members from all sides of the House of Commons and of course members from the other place as well. It has been working well now for over three and a half years, has produced seven fundamental reviews and three annual reports. I have tried to set out for members, colleagues and Canadians how we conduct reviews under the legislation, when we are asked to redact, how we are asked to redact and the limitations on being asked to redact.
The message I want to leave with all parliamentarians is the following: Committee members form a dedicated non-partisan group of parliamentarians from both houses who take pride in undertaking serious work on serious national security and intelligence issues.
Mr. Alex Ruff (Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, CPC):
Madam Speaker, I would like to correct the member. In his speech, he talked about the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians as a proxy of Parliament. I remind him that, unlike similar bodies in other Five Eyes countries, such as the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament in the U.K. or the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security in Australia, the NSICOP is not a special committee nor a standing committee of the Parliament of Canada.
It is, in fact, part of the executive of government. Therefore, it does not report to the House, it reports to the Prime Minister.
Madam Speaker, the hon. member is partly correct and partly incorrect. NSICOP is located halfway between Parliament and the executive. The committee is housed within the executive body of government and does report to the Prime Minister, but it is composed of parliamentarians. It is not bound by the procedural rules of parliamentary committees and operates at arm's length.
However, the Five Eyes organizations the member refers to for comparative purposes have their own variations on structure. As I mentioned in my speech, the ISC in the United Kingdom has a very similar, if not identical, reporting relationship with its Prime Minister, who also is involved in redactions of reports before those reports are made public by being tabled in their house, just as our reports here are made public by tabling through the Prime Minister.
Committee members from all political stripes contribute their unique perspectives as legislators to national security and intelligence matters. They have a range of experience, but together they represent perspectives from across this country.
Mr. Jack Harris (St. John's East, NDP):
Madam Speaker, the suggestion that this committee is appropriate was basically rejected by the Speaker in his ruling today. In reference to the National Security Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, he said:
However, as the members for Louis-Saint-Laurent and St. John’s East have pointed out, the act also makes clear that, despite its composition, this body is not a committee of Parliament. It exists outside of Parliament. In these circumstances, the Chair cannot conclude that the documents submitted to the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians fulfills an order of this House or of its committees.
That is very clear, and I invite you to refute that ruling.
The Assistant Deputy Speaker (Mrs. Carol Hughes):
I am not going to refute it. I will ask the hon. member to do that.
However, before I ask the hon. member to do that, I am going stop the clock and ask him to maybe unplug and then plug in his mike again. There seems to be an issue for the interpreters. If he could do that and then maybe give me a quick test.
We can continue, and if there is an issue, I will raise it again.
The hon. member for Ottawa South.
Madam Speaker, as I have noted in my remarks, the NSICOP Act allows the committee to review any matter relating to national security or intelligence that a minister of the Crown refers to it. The committee carefully deliberates before beginning one of its reviews, and it undertakes them on a very consensus basis. Deliberations can include discussions with relevant officials or with other review agencies or open-source research. The committee, of course, posts the launch of each of its reviews on its website.
I can confirm this evening that the committee has received a letter of referral from the Minister of Health. I can also confirm that the committee has received documents forwarded by the Public Health Agency of Canada in unredacted form.
Madam Speaker, given it is almost summer, I hope members will indulge me before I ask my question.
As this may be my last chance to speak before the break, I would like to thank my staff for their hard work over the years, especially during the pandemic, which has added additional stress for everyone. I thank my Whitehorse team, Susan Moorhead Mooney, Ellen MacDonald and Alisha Khalik, as well as my Ottawa team, Aaron Casselman and Brad Weston. Being the MP for Yukon has been the honour of my life, and I want to thank Yukoners for continuing to put their faith in me year after year.
My question is related to the point of privilege and on which committee this should go to.
I was very excited when NSICOP was created, as I thought long before that we really needed it. I assume that previously many of the most serious safety issues for Canada and security issues for Canadians were not being dealt with by parliamentarians because they did not have the right security clearance. However, the member's report suggests that has been much improved since the committee was created. From the reports he outlined tonight, I would like the member to confirm that it is true, that these serious issues—
The Assistant Deputy Speaker (Mrs. Carol Hughes):
The hon. member for Ottawa South.
Madam Speaker, to my colleague for Yukon, maybe I will take a moment to go back to a theme that I think is important to tonight's debate, and that is the question of whether the Prime Minister may direct a committee to revise its reports, and he may, but the discretion to do so is not unlimited.
The Prime Minister may only direct NSICOP to remove information that would be injurious to national security, national defence or international relations where that is a matter of solicitor-client privilege. The use of the word “would” in the legislation is a high bar. The process that determines which information qualifies is modelled on the process used by the Federal Court to redact information from public decisions. Finally, on that point, since the creation of the committee and throughout our seven comprehensive reviews, the government has never directed the committee to remove information from a report that was not legitimately injurious.
Mr. Dan Albas (Central Okanagan—Similkameen—Nicola, CPC):
Madam Speaker, I have a quick comment and then two brief questions.
First of all, I want to congratulate the member for completely ignoring the question before the House today. He read his way right through it.
Second, the member did give a very good, non-partisan overview of his committee, and so I would ask if he would be willing to come to my rotary club to give that presentation. We do not talk politics at our rotary club.
Finally, in his capacity as the member of Parliament for Ottawa South, will he be voting yea or nay for the actual motion?
Madam Speaker, the member's question gives me an opportunity to come back to an important theme that runs through the debate going on right now, which NSICOP members have been scrupulously careful not to directly participate in because of our special responsibilities. I mentioned the significant constraints that we all carry with respect to sharing information and the fact that our parliamentary privilege is waived in the context of the work we undertake. I know the member understands that and respects it.
I want to add to comments I made earlier, for his benefit and for the House's benefit, on government direction to the committee, a theme that has been raised in different places. The government has never pressured the committee to select or avoid a topic for review. It has never pressured the committee to change a finding or a recommendation. I think all members of our NSICOP committee would agree that we jealously guard the integrity and independence of the committee because we are seized with such profoundly important responsibilities in the area of national security and intelligence.
Mr. Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe (Lac-Saint-Jean, BQ):
Madam Speaker, I will give our hon. colleague a second chance to answer my Conservative colleague's question, since he just failed to answer it.
Will he vote in favour of the motion, yes or no?
Madam Speaker, I will wrap up my presence this evening in the House, which was for sharing the work of NSICOP: the membership, the act, the powers it possesses, the restrictions, its role and its mandate.
I really want to thank all of the members who have served on the committee since the committee was created three and a half years ago. I really want to welcome the new members from the Bloc Québécois, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party, who are joining other members, including a member from the NDP, and three senators. I am anxious for us to come together to continue to serve the Canadian people by taking on this enormous responsibility and sharing our findings with parliamentarians from all sides of the House.
We think we have an important role to play, and we believe we are acquitting ourselves reasonably well. However, we are always open to suggestions for improvement. I would ask the House to consider that there is a mandatory five-year review of the legislation that created NSICOP. It will be up for review in 2022, and I know all members of the committee would very much appreciate good guidance and recommendations for improvement in the way we operate.
